This study submits eleven business climate indexes to tests of their ability to predict relative economic performance on either side of state borders. Our results show that most business climate indexes have no ability to predict relative economic growth regardless of how growth is measured. Some are negatively correlated with relative growth. Many are better at reporting past growth than at predicting the future. In the end, the most predictive business climate index is the Grant Thornton Index which was discontinued in 1989. This study submits eleven business climate indexes to tests of their ability to predict relative economic performance on either side of state borders. Our results show that most business climate indexes have no ability to predict relative economic growth regardless of how growth is measured. Some are negatively correlated with relative growth. Many are better at reporting past growth than at predicting the future. In the end, the most predictive business climate index is the Grant Thornton Index which was discontinued in 1989.
State borders are the most logical place to test the performance of these business climate indicators because differences in state policies will have the largest effects on competitors in the same area. Firms located in the interior of the state have the benefit of distance to moderate the adverse consequences of more favorable policies afforded their competitors in other states. In addition, almost all states have multiple borders, meaning that the same business climate can be tested against the variety of competing business climates of their neighboring states.
We impose several tests. The first examines the ability of each index to predict relative economic growth at the border over the next five years relative to its ability to explain relative growth over the past five years. This will tell us whether the index is focused on prediction or simply ranking based on past performance. The second examines whether an index has predictive power in any five year period between 1970 and 2010 regardless of when the index was published. If business climate persists, we may find that predictive power persists as well.
Finally, we allow the various business climate indexes to compete against one another in predicting relative economic growth over the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] period regardless of when the index was published. Various measures of growth were employed, including changes in aggregate income, per capita income, labor productivity, employment, wages, and population.
Our results show that most business climate indexes have no ability to predict relative economic growth regardless of how growth is measured. Some are negatively correlated with relative growth. Many are better at reporting past growth than at predicting the future. In the end, the most predictive business climate index is the Grant Thornton Index which was discontinued in 1989.
I. BACKGROUND ON BUSINESS CLIMATE INDICES
In 1975, the Fantus Corporation prepared a one-time ranking of state business climates for the Illinois Manufacturers Association. The report was based on Fantus' subjective assessment of 33 different indicators that were believed to affect manufacturing locations. That study was followed in 1979 by the first of a series of annual reports by Grant Thornton that used a weighted aggregation of 18 to 22 factors, with the weights determined by a survey of representatives of various manufacturer's associations. Both studies represented attempts to characterize a state's overall environment for business success, including tax policy, regulatory structure, labor force quality, and quality of life.
Since then, a variety of business climate indexes have been created. State rankings have been published on numerous criteria such as quality of life, cost of living, school quality, tax competitiveness, labor force quality, entrepreneurship, and green jobs. The ranking business has been extended to the metropolitan level. These rankings are reproduced by local newspapers, Chambers of Commerce, and Economic Development Commissions.
The indexes clearly view themselves as in competition with one another. The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CED, 1987, p. 2) stated that, "the Grant Thornton index does not measure the factors important to business success in today's economy. The index and the traditional business climate definition it perpetuates are relics from another time, another economy-an economy based on routine mass production where cheap, low skilled labor is the key to success." In contrast, the CED (1987, p. 3) asserted that its index, "provides a more accurate and more comprehensive picture of how state economies are doing in today's economy and, thus, how 'attractive' they really are for business development." Twelve years later, the Progressive Policy Index justified its creation of the State New Economy Index on similar grounds. "Unlike some other reports which assess state economic performance or state economic policies, this report focuses more narrowly on a simple question: to what degree does the structure of state economies match the ideal structure of the New Economy?" (Atkinson and Stewart, 2012) .
The two early business climate indexes produced by Fantus and Grant Thorton received some attention from academics.
1 However, since Grant Thornton discontinued its index in 1989, its successors have rarely been subjected to academic scrutiny. Kolko, Neumark and Cuellar Mejia's (2013) study is the first serious published analysis since 1989. Using aggregate state measures of output, employment and wages, they conclude that indexes that focused on simpler tax structures and smaller welfare states tended to perform better in predicting relative state growth. However, business climate indexes had only modest explanatory power in explaining relative state economic growth compared to factors beyond policy influence such as weather, proximity to a major waterway, industrial mix, and population density.
Missing from previous studies of business climate indexes is an effort to control for the endogeneity of government policies concerning growth. As noted by Kolko et al (2013) have sufficient time to evaluate each index's predictive power for at least five years after release.
All of the included indexes were nationally prominent. We only included indexes that provided sufficient detail for us to certify that they were based on objective criteria as opposed to subjective evaluations, and we focused on indexes based on structural measures (e.g. tax policies, factor endowments, or environmental amenities) as opposed to performance measures (e.g. the level or growth of production). We view performance measures as reflective of the outcomes of, rather than the inputs to, the business climate. For example, we exclude the Inc. The use of relative economic performance at the border can also be justified as a variation of regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) . Land on either side the border is subject to a sudden change in business climate. Property owners cannot move the land to take advantage of the favorable economic climate on the other side of the border. Therefore, examining the economic activity on either side of the border will reflect the impact of location-specific business climates on economic decisions using land on either side of the border, land that otherwise would be equally productive.
We begin by identifying all counties in the U.S. that border another state. One might suspect that these business climate indexes do little more than report past growth rather than predicting future growth. We can test that by reversing the specification in 1) to be
where the left-hand-side is the relative growth from period 0-t to period 0. If the business climate index were truly forward looking, it should have more positive predictive power in (1) than in (2). If the business climate index is backward looking, it will do better at explaining the past than the future.
A complication is that the borders for county i in state j will rarely coincide exactly with the borders of county i in state j'. More typically portions of county i in state j will border two or three counties in state j'. Furthermore, borders will differ in the number of counties, leading to overweighting of long borders or borders with small counties. To prevent problems of double counting counties with multiple neighbors and of overweighting of borders with more counties, we used the strategy illustrated in Figure 1 .
Let the total length of the border between the two states be L jj' . The total border length can be divided into unique, non-overlapping border segments. For example, if county i in state j borders counties 1, 2, and 3 in state j', there will be three corresponding non-overlapping border segments with respective lengths of ℓ i11j' , ℓ i12j' , and ℓ i13j' . These three lengths sum to ℓ ij, the total border length of county i in state j. Each of the three segments enters regression (1):
The weights add up to 1, so each border enters with a cumulative weight of one, whether there is a single county or twenty counties. 8 In practice, we found that the weighted regressions yielded estimates similar to a regression that used a correction for clustering on the border which also results in each border entering with the same weight in the regression. Because the cluster correction was more straightforward, we opted to report those results.
We use eight different measures of growth, all available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis' Regional Economic Accounts. 9 The use of multiple growth measures bypasses concerns that different business climate indexes might be focusing on different aspects of economic success. Four measures reflect elements of total output: aggregate income which includes returns to proprietors as well as compensation, aggregate nonfarm income, income per capita and population. If the state's business climate enhances prospects for profit or productivity growth, it should attract more firm entry and expansion. Personal income is the best available measure of aggregate local output, although it will miss profits that go to nonresident investors and it will include income derived from other areas. Personal income can be decomposed into population and income per capita. Nonfarm income removes the receipts from farms. Because about one-third of U.S. farmland is rented with rental income and government transfer payments going to non-proprietors, farm income may cloud our estimate of local output.
A concern is that wage and salary income for residents may be derived from businesses that are located across the border. To address this concern, the remaining four growth indicators are more closely related to the local labor market and worker productivity: average wage per job, output per worker, the county wage bill, and total employment. The county wage bill is the sum of all wages and salaries paid to employees plus the cost of employer provision of benefits such as pensions and insurance, plus the cost of the federally mandated social insurance programs.
These are reported by place of work rather than by place of residence, and so these data will include workers commuting from a neighboring state. The wage bill is the largest component of gross state product, representing about 60% of the total state. Consequently, growth in the wage bill is the closest approximation to growth in county output attributable to labor. Wage bill can be decomposed into its two elements, employment and compensation per job. Absent any restrictions on commuting, wages should equalize on either side of a state border with the more productive side having more employees and faster job growth than its less productive neighbors.
Therefore, employment should be more responsive than per worker compensation to relative business climate. 10 We also have the option of deriving a measure of output per worker by combining wage and salary earnings with proprietor's income and then dividing by employment plus proprietors. As with wages, mobile labor should equalize labor productivity growth across the state border and so we would not anticipate that the business climate indexes would be able to predict relative productivity growth.
III. PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE OF RELATIVE BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES
We summarize the results of our estimation of equations 1) and 2) in Table 2 . Our dependent variables are the eight growth measures applied to the five years preceding the release date of each index and the five years following the release date. These results are reported in the columns labeled "Backcast" and "Forecast" respectively. The five year elapsed time should be sufficient to allow private investment to respond to favorable government policies and to insure that our results are not overly clouded by temporary business cycles. 11 In addition, because the same national business cycle would be occurring on both sides of the state border, results should not be altered because of shocks to the national economy.
For indexes with multiple editions, we report the average across all releases. For example, with 7 Grant Thornton editions released between 1980 and 1986, we report how many times out of the 7 the coefficient on relative business climate was positive ( > 0), how many times it was significantly positive ( ≫ 0), how many times it returned a significant negative coefficient ( ≪ 0), and the average of the coefficient which we define as the business climate index elasticity ̅ . We also report the average R 2 from the regressions to indicate how much of the variation in relative economic growth at the border can be explained by relative values of the business climate index. All results correct for clustering at the state border.
Across all the 5-year forecast regressions across 8 different indicators of economic performance, it is apparent that none of the 11 business climate indexes can explain much of the variation in relative growth at state borders. The best business climate index can explain at most 3% of the variation in relative growth over the next five years. Perhaps growth is primarily driven by fundamentals such as factor endowments and locational comparative advantage and not business climate, or perhaps these measures of business climate are just not that good.
That said, some of the indexes seem better than others. The Grant Thornton index generates the expected positive effect of relative business climate on relative growth over the following five years in 49 of 56 possible cases in the Forecast column including 28 significant positive effects against no significant negative effects. Grant Thornton performs particularly well where an index should be able to predict outcomes, namely growth in aggregate income, wage bill, employment, and population, and it performs less well on relative wages and productivity which should grow similarly on either side of the border. Moreover, the index appears to be truly forward looking in that it performs much better in forecasting than in backcasting. Grant Thornton generated only 12 significant positive effects on growth over the past 5 years against the 28 significant coefficients going forward.
The other index that appeared to perform well is the Corporation for Economic Development Capacity Index which generated 17 significant positive effects on relative growth at the borders against 5 significant negative effects. Like the Grant Thornton index, it appears to be genuinely forward looking as it had only 3 significant positive coefficients in its backcasting regressions.
Some indexes seem to have information for a few outcomes but not others. For example, the Tax Foundation index seems to forecast relative population growth on either side of the border. However, it has strangely negative results in projecting per capita income, average wage and productivity, the series that should be equilibrating on either side of the border. That it failed to register positively or negatively for most series suggests that its success in forecasting relative population growth may be a fluke.
Even more perversely, some indexes consistently predict in the wrong direction. The
Small Business Survival Index produces consistently incorrect forecasts of relative growth in nonfarm income, population, employment and the wage bill. The Corporation for Economic Development-Policy and Fiscal Policy Indexes also explain relatively more of the variation in relative economic growth outcomes than the other indexes, but in the wrong direction. Across the two series, we have 33 significant negative coefficients against only 4 positive effects.
However, they are clearly not trying to replicate the past in that all 32 significant coefficients on relative business climate in the backcast columns are negative.
The New Economy Index was the only one that seemed to look backward rather than forward. It generated 3 significantly negative and no significantly positive coefficients in its forecasting equations, but 6 significantly positive coefficients in its backcasting equations. The remaining indexes had almost no predictive power going either forward or backward, suggesting they had no information to offer on why states grow at different rates on either side of their borders.
V. DO BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEXES EXPLAIN GROWTH IN ANY PERIOD?
Our indexes that were issued on multiple years are highly correlated over time,
suggesting that their evaluations of relative business climate are quite stable. It may be that a business climate index will do better in some other five year period, even if it does not distinguish itself in the first five years after its release. On the other hand, we may find that a business climate index that appears to have some forecasting ability over the next five years will have a similar ability to explain relative growth in other five year periods also. We explore these questions in We perform this analysis using relative growth in nonfarm income, population, wage bill and employment as our measures of economic outcomes. The first of these is reported in Table   3A . In the last column we report the common out-of-sample forecast period for all 11
indexes. Only the CED-Capacity Index demonstrates any ability to predict relative economic performance at state borders over that 5-year period, albeit only explaining about 1% of the variation in relative growth of nonfarm income.
We repeat the exercise with other growth measures in the next three tables. The results from Table 3 show that the relatively successful indexes have some persistence in explaining relative growth across states. The effects are relatively small such that a 10% difference in business climate index would have less than 1% difference in relative growth. However, these indexes were relatively stable over time and the estimated effects were quite consistent over long stretches of time. That suggests that a poor business climate index as measured by Grant Thornton could lead to progressively poorer relative economic performance of the state over the following decades.
The best performing indexes including the Grant Thornton, PRI, Small Business and Tax Foundation Indexes, all emphasized relative tax policy in measuring business climate. Of the others, only the CED-Capacity Index managed to have predictive power in the right direction and that only for nonfarm income growth. The Beacon Hill, New Economy, Fraser and CEDDevelopment and Fiscal Indexes had no ability to predict forward.
VI. COMPOSITE BUSINESS CLIMATE
Even the best performing indexes in Table 3 Presuming that these 11 indexes exhaust the available expertise of economic development experts regarding relative growth potential, the combined explanatory power of their forecasts should be an upper-bound measure of the best performance possible by any individual index.
The results are reported in Table 4 . Across the four growth measures, the combined forecasts can only explain 3.5-6% of the variation in economic growth. That suggests that even the very best business climate index can only explain a small fraction of the relative economic performance of states. The great majority of economic performance is due to factors other than measurable business climate.
One might be tempted to examine the individual coefficients in Table 4 and claim that the results demonstrate relative value of the individual indexes in explaining relative performance.
In fact, the 2004 Small Business Index does maintain its ability to predict relative growth at the borders as it did in Table 3 , at least at the 10 th percentile significance level. However, by itself, the Small Business Index could explain no more than 3% of any of the growth measures, and it could not explain any of the variation in nonfarm income growth. In other words, the Small Business Index is the best performer compared to the others, but that is not a very high bar.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The recent paper by Kolko et al (2013) covered some of the same ground as this study but using states as the unit of observation. As they stress, there are issues of endogenous policy responses to relative growth that could complicate interpretation of their results if states base their policies on business climate indexes. However, our results buttress two findings that they report -that tax based indexes perform better and that most of the sources of growth are outside the influence of economic policy.
This study adds the following stylized facts about business climate indexes:
1) The information content in the better business climate indexes is amazingly persistent.
Grant Thornton indexes released in the 1980s remained among the best performing indexes in explaining relative growth across state borders 25 years later.
2) The business climate indexes explain an even smaller fraction of the variation in relative state growth than implied by the Kolko et al (2013) state-level analysis. We estimate that even the very best business climate index could explain at most 3.5-6% of economic growth across state borders, depending on the measure of growth employed.
3) The indexes that purport to measure local economic innovation, infrastructure, labor market skill, or other indicators of the 'new economy' have no explanatory power and, in fact, explain the past more than the future.
A general conclusion that would follow from both the Kolko et al (2013) analysis and ours is that the business climate indexes lack the scientific rigor typically required of social science research. Indexes claim validity based on included inputs rather than testing forecasts against the data. Both studies suggest that there is considerable potential for improved measures if modern econometric forecasting tools are applied to the task.
1 See Plaut and Pluta (1983) and Lane et al (1989) for generally favorable studies. An unpublished paper by Courant and Fulton (1985) concluded that the Grant Thornton index had weak predictive power except in recessions.
2 For example, Rork (2003) shows that taxes on mobile resources respond positively to rates in neighboring states; a 10 percent home states' tax rates decline between 1.6 and 6.4 percent for a 10 percent decrease in neighboring states' tax rates, depending on the tax.
3 Our indexes overlap extensively with the indexes studies by Kolko et al (2013) . Our set includes the Grant Thornton and FANTUS indexes that predate the Kolko et al study and we exclude the Cato Institute Report Card on the Nation's Governors because it emphasized shortterm policy responses rather than structural measures which we viewed as more permanent and likely to affect long-term private investments. 4 These are reported in Appendix Table 2 .
5 Because the various editions of an index are highly inter-correlated, we pick an index at the midpoint of the series of releases as the representative index. To make the correlations easier to interpret, indexes for which smaller numbers imply better climates were multiplied by -1. 6 While not focused on competition among businesses, McKinnish's (2005) finding that welfare participation in border counties is significantly higher compared with interior counties illustrates this idea.
7 Previous studies using relative growth at the borders to assess policy effects include Fox (1986) who analyzed retail sales taxes, Holmes (1998) who analyzed of right-to-work laws, Holcombe , 1975-2010. b Statistics for the best performing regression which has > 0.
c Estimate for the out of sample period 2005-2010. Standard errors corrected for clustering by border. * significance at the 10th percentile; ** significance at the 5th percentile. Tax, Sales and Gross Receipts Tax, Fiscal Balance, Tax Base Conformity. The major indexes contain 18 subindexes and 32 measures.  Each major index is weighted equally to form the aggregate index. Each sub-index is weighted equally within the major indexes. In many instances, a measure equals a sub-index (e.g., tax rates)  The 2004 index replaces adds the Conformity index variables into the other major indexes and adds an Unemployment Tax index. It also expands the number of sub-indexes and measures, and alters the weighting scheme to diminish the weights of "yes-or-no" variables.
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